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Standards of Appellate Review for Denial of Counsel
and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Child
Protection and Parental Severance Cases
William Wesley Patton*
I. INTRODUCTION
John and Nancy Prough entered the courthouse in Urbana, Illinois
hoping to walk out with their four children, whom the Illinois Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") had taken away.'
The State prepared an impressive array of evidence indicating that the
Proughs had neglected their children and were incapable of improving
their parental skills.2 John and Nancy, both of whom suffered from
mental retardation,3 met their court appointed attorney for the first time
on the day of their hearing.4 In court, the State moved to have the
judge decide the adjudicatory issue (whether the Prough children were
* Professor and Director, Center for Children's Rights, Whittier Law School; B.A.,
1971, California State University, Long Beach; M.A., 1974, J.D., 1977, University of
California at Los Angeles. This article is dedicated to Ruby Patton.
This article is an update and elaboration of two articles previously written by Professor
Patton. For Professor Patton's first article concerning appellate review of denial of
counsel in child protection and parental severance cases, see William W. Patton, It
Matters Not What Is But What Might Have Been: The Standard of Appellate Review for
Denial of Counsel in Child Dependency & Parental Severance Trials, 12 WHrITER L.
REV. 537 (1991). For Professor Patton's previous article concerning the right to
counsel in child protection and parental severance cases, see William W. Patton, Forever
Torn Asunder: Charting Evidentiary Parameters, The Right to Competent Counsel & The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in California Child Dependency & Parental
Severance Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299 (1987). This current article broadens the
scope of the previous articles by looking at these issues at a national level, and also
takes into account numerous recent changes in the law.
I. The following narrative comes from the facts recorded in In re Prough, 376 N.E.2d
1078 (II1. App. Ct. 1978).
2. An Urbana police officer and a social worker both testified that the Proughs' home
was filthy and that the children had suffered from the worst case of neglect they had ever
seen. Id. at 1080. An official from the housing authority which housed the Proughs, and
an agent of DCFS, also testified that the Prough children were neglected by their parents.
Id. at 1080-81. Local school officials testified that the Prough children often missed
school and a pediatrician testified that one of the children had contracted bacterial
pneumonia because of exposure. Id. at 1081.
3. A doctor testified that John was mentally retarded and Nancy was in the "borderline
range" of retardation. Id. at 1081.
4. Id. at 1079.
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neglected) and the dispositional issue (whether John and Nancy's
parental rights should be terminated) at the same hearing.5 Because
neither the Proughs nor their attorney objected to this, the Proughs lost
the right to argue on appeal that the judge was in error when he com-
bined these two typically separate proceedings.6
In affirming the trial court's decision to terminate the Proughs' pa-
rental rights, the appellate court, although it acknowledged that the
Proughs' attorney "played essentially a passive role in the proceed-
ings,"'7 found the attorney competent because he acted in a way that
"was typical of most attorneys who represent the interests of other
children in similar proceedings. '
Unfortunately, such instances of ineffective representation are not
uncommon in the child abuse and neglect system. In one sense, the
Proughs were fortunate to have even a "passive" attorney. Many juris-
dictions do not require trial courts to provide indigent parents with
representation.9
Few individuals in the child protection portion'0 of the nation's ju-
venile court system really want parents and children to have zealous
and competent advocates. " Even when attorneys are appointed in
5. Id. at 1082.
6. Id. The appellate court noted that it believed it was better to hold separate
proceedings for these two issues, but it held that "the consolidation [of the adjudicatory
and dispositional hearings] may be proper where there is no resulting prejudice." Id.
This result was echoed more recently in In re Jackson, 611 N.E.2d 1356 (III. App. Ct.
1993).
7. Prough, 376 N.E.2d at 1083.
8. Id.
9. See infra part 11.
10. Throughout this article, the term "child protection cases" refers to cases in which
juvenile courts attempt to protect children from abuse, neglect, or dependency. These
cases are usually divided into two separate proceedings: (I) the adjudicatory hearing,
which determines whether the children involved were indeed abused or neglected, and (2)
the dispositional hearing (also referred to as "parental severance hearings"), which
determines, among other custodial decisions, whether the children's parents' parental
rights should be terminated. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705 § 405/1-3(1), (6)
(West 1993) (defining the terms adjudicatory and dispositional hearings).
I I. "Despite Gault, a continuing judicial hostility to an advocacy role in traditional
treatment-oriented courts persists." BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT
TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE COURTS 29 (1993) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S I (1967))..
Government attorneys often argue with duplicity; on the one hand they argue that
parents and children lack a constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel in
cases in which counsel is requested, and on the other hand, they argue that if such a right
exists it cannot be waived because of the importance of counsel in these actions. See,
e.g., In re Justin L., 233 Cal. Rptr. 632, 636-37 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that parents,
like criminal defendants, have a right to waive counsel and represent themselves). Of
course there are notable exceptions, such as Judge Leonard P. Edwards, who stated that
"[w]hen children have a significant interest in these legal proceedings, they should have
1996] Appellate Review in Child Protection Cases
child abuse and neglect cases, the expectations regarding the quality of
that advocacy are extremely low; it is as though there is a lesser defi-
nition of "competence" when analyzing advocacy for parents and chil-
dren than for criminal defendants. 2
This is not to suggest, however, that juvenile courts are hesitant to
appoint competent representation because they seek to treat parents
unfairly. Put yourself in the judge's chair of a case I litigated in 1983,
In re Jonathan G., as part of a UCLA Law School trial advocacy
course.' 3 The judge was trapped by a mountain of cases. Giving me
time to represent my clients zealously would mean the pile would grow
much faster than usual.' 4 When I filed my ninety-seven page writ
effective and independent representation to address their legal and nonlegal needs, both
inside and outside the courtroom." Leonard P. Edwards, A Comprehensive Approach to
the Representation of Children: The Child Advocacy Coordinating Council, 27 FAM.
L.Q. 417, 417 (1993) [hereinafter Edwards, Comprehensive Approach]. There are at
least four models of representing children: (1) the "champion," who helps the court
reach the best interest for the child; (2) the "advocate," who represents the child just as
she would represent an adult client; (3) the "impartial investigator," who investigates all
facts and informs the court; and (4) the "law guardian," who is "part advocate and part
guardian ... she has a statutory mandate to represent both a child's interests and
wishes." Angela D. Lurie, Note, Representing The Child-Client: Kids Are People Too:
An Analysis of the Role of Legal Counsel to a Minor, I I N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 205,
207-11 (1993). See also Rebecca H. Hertz, Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse and
Neglect Proceedings: Clarifying the Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 FAM. L.Q. 317,
322 (1993). There is some evidence that truly zealous advocacy is not the most effective
lawyering style, at least in juvenile delinquency cases. See FELD, supra, at II.
12. In many systems there is a potential conflict of interest because the court hires
and pays the children's attorneys, a practice which the Prado Commission decried in its
1993 report on the appointment of public defenders by the court. Lincoln Caplan,
Unequal Loyalty, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 55-57. In Los Angeles County the judges
solicit, select, review, and compensate private attorneys in dependency court. See Los
Angeles Superior Court Notice To Attorneys, L.A. DAILY J. DAILY APPELLATE REP., June
26, 1995, at 8289. "Attorneys are selected by the judicial officers assigned to each
juvenile courthouse." Id.; see William W. Patton, Forever Torn Asunder: Charting Evi-
dentiary Parameters, The Right To Competent Counsel And The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in California Child Dependency And Parental Severance Cases, 27 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 299, 308-309 & n.48-49 (1987) [hereinafter Patton, Torn Asunder].
13. Los Angeles Superior Court Case Numbers A13379 and J921748, and California
Court of Appeal Case Number B002238. Since this case involved allegations of child
dependency and parental severance, I have redacted any identifying or confidential data.
14. The total number of juvenile dependency hearings in Los Angeles County rose
from 19,965 in 1981 to 67,111 in 1992. INTER-AGENCY COUNCIL ON CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: DATA ANALYSIS REPORT FOR 1993, at 110. However, in 1992 there was only
"an applied judicial manpower" of 15 judges to handle the 67,111 juvenile hearings. Id.
at 11l. Therefore each judge heard over 4,500 cases in 1992. Assuming that a judge sat
in each of the available court rooms for 40 hours a week and for 52 weeks a year, the
total judicial hours available per court room is only 2,080. Therefore, the cases must
average less than 30 minutes each. In 1983 when there were only 38,700 case referrals,
each Los Angeles County dependency judge heard an average of 5 to 10 new cases and as
many as 25 reviews of ongoing cases a day. Child Abuse a Growing Tragedy in L.A.
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along with several other trial motions, the judge was not the only
player in the dependency system to cringe. My opponent, a deputy
county counsel, immediately moved to have UCLA Law School and
myself removed from the case because we were incompetent attorneys,
as we had never before litigated a parental severance case. 5 County
counsel, no less than the judge, was aggravated that we were litigating
this parental severance case with the vigor we would have applied to a
major contract or real property dispute among rival giant corporations.
When we estimated a three day trial in which we would call expert
witnesses, both the judge and county counsel reacted as though we
had stolen from them something very precious, and the judge re-
sponded by forbidding live testimony on the writ issues. 6
The judge's and county counsel's attitudes, however, should not
surprise anyone, because bias against family issues and for com-
mercial concerns is ever present in our courts. Professor Deborah L.
Rhode recalls "a judge in the California court system recently describ-
ing 10 days spent handling a $100,000 commercial dispute; during the
same period, a judge in a typical domestic relations court in California
would be expected to process 1,000 cases involving children."'' 7
County, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1983, at I, col. 2.
15. Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, at 3, Case Number A13379 (Nov. 20, 1984)
[hereinafter Transcript, No. A 13379] (on file with author). Of course, the court informed
county counsel that it did not have jurisdiction to remove the parents' counsel without
the parents' waiver. See Smith v. Superior Court, 440 P.2d 65, 74-75 (Cal. 1968). This
argument was reductio ad absurdum: If you are presumed incompetent until you have
handled a specific type of case, no one can ever handle such a case because they will lack
this "first-time" experience. Fortunately, County Counsel's motion to remove UCLA
and myself was denied along with the motion for sanctions. Transcript, No. A 13379,
supra, at 3-8.
16. The judge responded, "I won't receive any live testimony." Transcript, No.
A 13379, at 9. There is no doubt that providing counsel for children costs money. In
denying a law guardian for a child one judge exclaimed, "I have trouble tying up the
resources of the court ...." In re Audrey "PP," 535 N.Y.S.2d 136 (App. Div. 1988).
The cost of providing attorneys for children leads to a "search for more cost effective
methods ... such as citizen volunteers." Hertz, supra note I1, at 327-28. One drastic
measure attempted by the Los Angeles Superior Court in its Juvenile Dependency Court
Policy Memorandum was to end representation at an early stage; "attorneys appointed to
represent indigent parents are to be relieved following the first review . . . 'unless good
cause to the contrary is individually shown by any attorney seeking to remain appointed
on the case."' In re Tanya H., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 503, 504 (1993) (citation omitted). The
court did note regarding the initial counsel, however, that "the juvenile court's fiscal
problems cannot justify an interference with a statutory right to counsel." Id. at 507.
On July 26, 1995, Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson signed AB 150 which
stripped parents of their statutory right to appointed counsel in child protection cases.
John Franz, Budget Bill Scraps Constitutional Rights, Wis. ST. J., Sept. 30, 1995, at 7A
(noting that "presumably, this [the abrogation of the statutory right to counsel] was
done to save money").
17. James Podgers, Chasing the Ideal: As More Americans Find Themselves Priced
1996] Appellate Review in Child Protection Cases
The resistance to zealous advocacy in In re Jonathan G. is system-
atically mirrored throughout the child abuse and neglect system.' 8
This Article is premised on the assertion that appointing competent
counsel for parents and children serves the interests of everyone in-
volved in child protection and parental severance cases.' 9 It will ana-
lyze how the system's bias has led to inconsistent and unwise deci-
sions regarding the standard of review for allegations of failure to
appoint counsel for parents and children and failure of appointed
counsel to render effective representation.'0 Specifically, this Article
asserts that parents and children possess a due process right to a deter-
mination of whether they are entitled to counsel.2  Next, the analysis
discusses various standards of review for the denial of counsel under
both statutory and constitutional frameworks. 22 This Article also ana-
lyzes the standard of review for the lack of effective representation by
appointed counsel in child protection cases.2 3 Finally, this work pro-
poses-two standards for appellate review to serve the best interests of
the states, parents, and children.24
Out of the System, the Struggle Goes on to Fulfill the Promise of Equal Justice for All,
A.B.A. J., Aug., 1994, at 57.
18. "Children too frequently find themselves before courts without benefit of counsel,
despite their constitutional and statutory rights to counsel in many kinds of cases."
America's Children At Risk: A National Agenda for Legal Action, Executive Summary of
the American Bar Association Presidential Working Group on the Unmet Legal Needs of
Children and Their Families, 1993, 27 FAM. L.Q. 433, 442 (1993). The common
reasons for judges not appointing counsel for children are "the additional costs . . . ;
lack of demonstrated competence . . . [and] belief that attorneys for the parents will
adequately protect the child's interests. The judge's decision not to appoint an attorney
is rarely overturned and then only for an abuse of discretion." Linda D. Elrod, Counsel
for the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time Is Now, 26 FAM. L.Q. 53, 56 (1992). See
also Howard Davidson, The Child's Attorney: Understanding the Role of Zealous Advo-
cate, 17 FAM. ADVOC. 73, 74 (1995).
19. For a fuller discussion of the need for competent counsel in child protection and
parental severance cases, see Patton, Torn Asunder, supra note 12, at 305-08.
20. Even though the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974
mandates appointment of a guardian ad litem for children in child dependency cases,
"many fail to receive that kind of assistance." Edwards, supra note 11, at 418-19.
21. See infra part ll.A.
22. See infra part ll.B.
23. See infra part III.A. "Implementation of the right to counsel guaranteed to
children in delinquency proceedings . . . is rarely realized for children . . . [and] even
when children are represented, too often their attorneys lack either the commitment or
the knowledge to provide competent, much less zealous, representation." Robert E.
Shepherd, Jr., America's Children at Risk, 8 CRIM. JUST. 35, 36 (1994).
24. See infra part III.B.
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II. FAILURE TO APPOINT COUNSEL FOR PARENTS AND CHILDREN
IN CHILD PROTECTION AND PARENTAL SEVERANCE HEARINGS
The United States Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services" determined that parents do not necessarily have a due
process right to counsel in child dependency or parental severance
hearings.26 Because Lassiter involved a parental severance case which
could have resulted in permanent loss of custody, many state courts
have determined that When the threatened loss of custody is only
temporary, a federal due process right to counsel does not apply."
However, the state courts denying parents the right to counsel in child
protection or termination cases have failed to recognize that the Court
in Lassiter held that the facts of each individual case may give rise
under Matthews v. Eldridge28 to a constitutional right to appointed
counsel.29
This Part will discuss the proper scope of the parent's constitutional
right to counsel in child protection and parental rights termination
cases, addressing the problems that arise when state court judges
utilize their discretion in deciding whether to appoint counsel in such
cases. 3° The Part then discusses the standards of appellate review that
courts have applied to the denial of counsel on both statutory3' and
constitutional 32 grounds. Finally, this Part addresses the difficulties in
applying harmless error analysis to the denial of counsel when the
25. 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981) (explaining that "as a litigant's interest in personal
liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel").
26. Several state courts have held, however, that under independent state
constitutional grounds parents have a constitutional right to court appointed counsel.
See, e.g., V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42, 44 (Alaska 1983); In re Trowbridge, 401 N.W.2d
65 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); In re D.D.F., 801 P.2d 703, 706-07 (Okla. 1990), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 922 (1991); In re H. Luscier's Welfare, 524 P.2d 906, 909 (Wash.
1974).
27. Some "jurisdictions follow a middle road and require appointment of counsel for
indigent parents in dependency and neglect proceedings where there is a reasonable
possibility that parental rights will be terminated or there will be a prolonged
separation between the parent and child." In re Cooper, 631 P.2d 632, 639 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1981).
28. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
29. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of whether children under certain circumstances also have a due process right to
counsel. However, that argument is beginning to find its way in state courts. For
instance, in In re Jamie T.T., 599 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), the court
determined under the Matthews balancing test that "Jamie had a constitutional as well as
a statutory right to legal representation." See infra part ll.A for an explanation and
application of this test.
30. See infra part II.A.
31. See infra part II.B. 1.
32. See infra part ll.B.2.
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termination of the parent-child relationship hangs in the balance,33 and
proposes the burden of proof necessary to prove harmlessness in such
instances. 34
A. Parents and Children Have a Due Process Right to a Lassiter
Hearing to Determine Whether They Are Constitutionally Entitled to
Appointed Counsel
In Matthews v. Eldridge,35 the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished a three-prong analysis for determining what due process re-
quires in administrative and court proceedings.36 The three factors the
Matthews Court held should be weighed in such cases are: (1) the
private interest at stake, (2) the governmental interest, and (3) the risk
of error or injustice.37 In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,38
the Court applied this test to decide whether an indigent parent had a
due process right to counsel when defending her parental rights from
termination:
[T]he parent's interest [in retaining her parental rights] is an
extremely important one (and may be supplemented by the
dangers of criminal liability inherent in some termination
proceedings); the State shares with the parent an interest in a
correct decision, has a relatively weak pecuniary interest [the
cost of providing counsel], and, in some but not all cases, has a
possibly stronger interest in informal procedures; and the
complexity of the proceeding and the incapacity of the
uncounseled parent could be, but would not always be, great
enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
parent's rights insupportably high.39
Thus, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that parents receive representation when "the parent's interest [is] at
[its] strongest, the State's interests [are] at their weakest, and the risks
of error [are] at their peak." 4
It would seem a relatively simple task on appeal to determine
whether under Lassiter and Matthews parents or children were uncon-
stitutionally denied counsel. However, because almost every state
now grants judges the discretion to appoint counsel for parents and
33. See infra part II.B.3.
34. See infra part Il.B.4.
35. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
36. Id. at 335.
37. id.
38. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
39. Id. at 31.
40. Id.
1996]
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children in dependency and termination proceedings, 4' Lassiter hear-
ings, in which trial courts put their measurement of the above factors
on record, rarely occur.42  Therefore, on appeal, when a parent or
child alleges the improper denial of counsel under Lassiter, the ap-
pellate court lacks an evidentiary record upon which to base its deter-
mination of the alleged constitutional error. This paucity of evidence
leads to at least three unfortunate results. First, an appellate court may
remand the case to the trial court to hold an evidentiary Lassiter hear-
ing, providing one more procedural hurdle before the affected children
realize finality and permanence. 3 Second, rather than remand the
case, the appellate court may attempt to speculate, based upon the
existing appellate record, whether the parent or child would have pre-
vailed had a Lassiter hearing been granted.44 Finally, the appellate
41. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 317-18 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19-1-105(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.89(2) (West
1994 & Supp. 1995); KANSAS STAT. ANN. 38-1505(a) (1993); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-
557 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-379.01(l)(b) (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.352 (Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §11.10 (a) (West 1993).
42. See, e.g., Smoke v. State, 378 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (holding
that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to apprise a father, in
dependency hearing, of his right to counsel); it re Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 644-45 (Del.
1986) (documents drawn up by mother relinquishing custody of son were violative of due
process since they were executed in the absence of counsel); h re N.S., 584 So. 2d 651,
651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that mother had no constitutional right to
counsel at dependency hearing where neither permanent termination of parental rights
nor criminal charges against mother were at issue); it re G.Y., 486 N.W.2d 288, 289
(Iowa 1992) (trial court not obligated to appoint counsel for child in "child in need of
assistance" hearing when guardian ad litem already appointed); In re J.J.B., 818 P.2d
1179, 1183 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that right of indigent parent to be
represented by counsel in "child in need of care" hearing was not dependent upon
whether request was made by parent but on the nature of the interest affected); h? re
Keifer, 406 N.W.2d 217, 218-19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the trial court's
failure to advise father of right to counsel, and that counsel may be appointed if party is
indigent, constitutes reversible error); hi re B.L.E., 723 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that the trial court committed reversible error in not appointing counsel
or obtaining clear waiver in parental termination hearing). But see hi re T.L.C., 566 So.
2d 691, 699 (Miss. 1990) (stating that the failure of trial court to inform a father,
charged with sexually abusing his child, of right to counsel, is harmless error).
43. For example, in In re Andrew S., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 675 (Ct. App. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1826 (1995), the court stated:
We add a final comment about the length of time this case [in which the
mother alleged denial of counsel at a parental termination hearing] has taken
to get to this point. When the dependency petition was filed, the age range of
the children was one and one-half months to four and one-half years. It is now
six years to ten and one-half years.
Id.
44. Trying to determine what might have happened if counsel had been appointed is
at best speculative; "no appellate court can fairly determine what would have happened at
the trial stage had the defendant not been denied his constitutional right to counsel."
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court may apply an inappropriate standard of appellate review, which
may dilute the appellant's constitutional Lassiter right to counsel when
judged under a mere abuse of discretion standard.
Concerning this third possibility, if a state adopts a standard less
than reversal per se for the denial of counsel in a termination hearing,
how will the reviewing court decide the issue of prejudice? "If the pre-
liminary showing [a Lassiter hearing] is erroneously dispensed with, it
is hardly surprising that the record contains no showing of what inde-
pendent counsel might have done for the minor. Yet unless there is
such a showing, the error is not reversible. '45 Because one of the
prime responsibilities of a zealous advocate is fact investigation, it is
impossible to determine what additional evidence might have been
presented had counsel been appointed. 46
Therefore, in order to perfect a parent's or child's potential right to
counsel under Lassiter, due process should mandate that the court in
each child protection and parental rights termination case hold a formal
Lassiter hearing. A few courts have recognized the right to such a
hearing.47 In addition to a hearing, however, in order to provide a
record for appeal, trial courts should explain their bases for denying
representation to an indigent.48
Furthermore, zealous counsel in these cases should request a
Lassiter hearing in every instance, even when a state statute provides
Philip J. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v.
California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519, 541 (1969).
45. In re Jacqueline H., 156 Cal. Rptr. 765, 768 (Ct. App. 1979). See also In re
Adoption of Jacob C., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 595-96 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that trial
court's failure to appoint counsel for minor children constituted reversible error since
children's rights were prejudiced); In re Richard E., 597 P.2d 495, 499-500 (Cal. 1978)
(holding that failure to appoint counsel was not prejudicial error).
46. The California Supreme Court, for example, listed several things that an attorney
could have done to uncover additional facts needed for a Lassiter decision, including
"interviews with other family members, neighbors, or teachers or independent
examinations of the minors by qualified psychologists." In re Melissa S., 225 Cal.
Rptr. 195, 202 (Ct. App. 1986). CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (e) (West 1984 &
Supp. 1996) mandates minimal levels of advocacy by children's attorneys including fact
investigation, interviewing witnesses, examining and cross-examining witnesses,
examining minors, and making recommendations for the minor.
47. See, e.g., Rhoades v. Penfold, 694 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that
"[uinder Lassiter, an indigent parent is entitled to a state court determination of right to
counsel"); In re J.J.B., 818 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that a
court hearing a petition to declare a child "in need of care" must make "an independent
determination as to whether the parent should be represented by counsel"); In re Baby
Girl Baxter, 479 N.E.2d 257, 260-61 (Ohio 1985) (noting that the right to independent
counsel might preclude an attorney from serving as both attorney for the parent and
guardian ad litem for the child).
48. In re Grannis, 680 P.2d 660, 665 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
1996] 203
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counsel. A Lassiter hearing assures that an appellate court will apply
the proper standard of appellate review49 when determining whether
error occurred or whether sufficient prejudice has been demonstrated,
and eliminates the need for the appellate court to speculate or remand
the case to determine the constitutionality of the denial of counsel.
Moreover, as the Kansas Supreme Court suggested in In re
Cooper,50 "[a]t the outset of every deprived child proceeding[,] the
court should require the state to make an opening statement outlining
the evidence which the state expects to introduce."5' This preliminary
statement by the state would help the trial court apply the Lassiter
criteria to determine, for instance, whether the issues are complicated,
whether expert witnesses will be called, (and if so the level of sophis-
tication of their testimony), whether difficult evidentiary issues are
involved, and whether parental termination or criminal consequences
are likely to result from the proceeding.52
B. The Appropriate Standard of Appellate Review for Denial of
Constitutionally Mandated Counsel
The courts disagree on the appropriate standard of review for alle-
gations by parents and children that they were deprived the assistance
of counsel in child protection and parental severance hearings. Some
of the variables courts have used to determine the method and stan-
dards of review include: (1) whether the right to counsel was statutory
or constitutional; 53 (2) whether the court considers the absence of
counsel a "structural defect" in the child protection context; 54 (3)
whether the failure to appoint counsel occurred in a "critical stage" of
the proceedings;55 and (4) whether the assistance of counsel is an
important aspect of fundamental fairness in light of other means for the
court to glean facts involving an appellant's case.56 Other factors
49. For a discussion of the proper standard of review in these cases, see infra part
ll.B.
50. 631 P.2d 632 (Kan. 1981).
51. Id. at 640.
52. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 n.3, 32.
53. See Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 851 P.2d 1307 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1221 (1994); In re Andrew S., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670 (Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied,
115 S. Ct. 1408 (1995). See also infra part 1.B.1 (discussing the standards of review
applicable to denial of statutorily mandated appointed counsel).
54. See Andrew S., 32 Cal. Rptr. at 670; Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1315. See also infra
part II.B.2 (discussing the standards of review applicable to denial of counsel under
Lassiter).
55. See Andrew S., 32 Cal. Rptr. at 670; Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1315-16.
56. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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courts may have to consider include the difficulty in determining the
error's effect and the sufficiency of the evidence. The following dis-
cussion analyzes the various standards of review appellate courts
employ in these cases.
1. Standards of Review Applicable to Denial of
Statutorily Mandated Appointed Counsel
The United States Supreme Court in Cooper v. California57 freed
the states to decide the proper standard of review in determining errors
not affecting federal rights. 8 Five years after Cooper, every state had
promulgated its own version of harmless error analysis to be applied to
violations of rights provided by state law.59
Because the Supreme Court allowed the states to fashion their stan-
dards of appellate review in these cases, there are a number of different
standards for determining whether errors in denying statutorily ap-
pointed counsel require reversal. The simplest standard to administer
is reversal per se. Under this standard of review, any case in which a
parent or child is denied his statutory right to counsel is reversed.
Some jurisdictions require "rigid adherence" to the requirements of the
juvenile court code as a component for fundamental fairness and auto-
matically reverse if the court violated a statutory mandate to appoint
counsel. 6° Other states have fashioned different variants of the harm-
less error rule6' and require a showing of prejudice before reversal will
be granted.62 In California, for instance, the parent or child has the
burden of demonstrating not only that the court abused its discretion
but also that the error resulted in a "miscarriage of justice" sufficient to
57. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
58. Id. at 62 (stating that "Ithe State is free, without review by [the United States
Supreme Court] to apply its own state harmless-error rule").
59. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless
Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 157 (1991).
60. See Smoke v. State, 378 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); In re S.L.,
599 N.E.2d 227, 229-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "[s]tatutory requirements
have been held jurisdictional for many years in Indiana . . . [and] must be construed
strictly"). The court rejected the State's substantial evidence analysis and held it
reversible error for failure to appoint a representative for the minor. Id. at 229-30; In re
Keifer, 406 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that "clear legal error"
required reversal without considering the sufficiency of the evidence); In re Richard, 431
S.E.2d 485, 488 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing a judgment in a termination case even
though the court did "not believe respondent mother has in any way been prejudiced by
this error [denial of counsel]"); In re Samuel H., 618 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994); In re Audrey "PP," 535 N.Y.S.2d 136 (App. Div. 1988).
6 1. For more on the harmless error rule, see infra part ll.B.3.
62. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. VI, § 13 (1993).
205
206 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
warrant reversal.63
Perhaps the greatest problem with appellate review of denial of
counsel in states where courts have statutory discretion to appoint
counsel is that courts often omit constitutional due process analysis
and instead merely determine under state law whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying appointed counsel. The result is not
problematic if the court finds sufficient prejudice from the failure to
follow the statutory directive. If, however, the court finds that there
was no statutory right to counsel and fails to determine whether there
was a constitutional right to counsel, the parents and children involved
will be denied review of possible Lassiter error.64 In addition, many
courts have held that parents and children have no right to competent
counsel if counsel was simply mandated pursuant to a statute rather
than by the state constitution.65 Other jurisdictions have held that the
parents' or children's burden in proving incompetence of counsel is
much higher in cases of statutorily appointed counsel than in cases
where counsel was required under Lassiter.66 Therefore, the court
must determine before any critical stage of a dependency case whether
counsel must be appointed pursuant to Lassiter or merely under a state
statute; the answer will likely have dramatic collateral consequences on
appeal.
63. See CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. VI, § 13 (1993); In re Richard E., 597 P.2d 495,
499 (Cal. 1978) (en banc) (explaining that "[t]he record discloses and Robert suggests
nothing which independent counsel for the minor might have done to better protect
Richard's interests"); In re Adoption of Jacob C., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 596 (Ct. App.
1994) (stating that "error in failing to appoint counsel is not reversible in the absence
of a showing of prejudice"); see also Smith v. Marion County Dep't of Pub. Welf., 635
N.E.2d 1144, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that there is no right to court
appointed counsel during proceedings that do not result in termination); In re Donna H.,
602 A.2d 1382, 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding no reversal without a showing of a
"gross abuse of discretion").
Courts must be careful not to confuse the federal miscarriage of justice rule with the
state rule. "In plain error analysis the phrase 'miscarriage of justice' means 'the
conviction of one who but for the error probably would have been acquitted .... '
Jeffrey L. Lowry, Note, Plain Error Rule-Clarifying Plain Error Analysis Under Rule
52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065,
1079-80 (1994) (quoting United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1111 (1985)). See also In re Melissa S., 225 Cal. Rptr.
195, 201-02 (Ct. App. 1986) (utilizing the miscarriage of justice rule to indicate the
gravity of the situation); In re Hall, 469 N.W.2d 56, 58-59 (Mich. Ct.'App. 1991)
(applying the harmless error rule).
64. In In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 640 A.2d 1085, 1095 n.6 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1994), the court determined that because the child was not provided
independent counsel "we need not address the constitutional issue [of the minor's right
to counsel]".
65. See infra part 111.
66. See infra part II.
Appellate Review in Child Protection Cases
2. Standards of Review Applicable to Denial
of Counsel Under Lassiter
If a court holds a Lassiter hearing and nevertheless denies the parent
or child the right to counsel, questions still surround the appropriate
standard of appellate review of that decision. In other words, what
should an appellate court do if it believes that a trial court has erro-
neously denied counsel because it misapplied the considerations set
down in Lassiter?67
The answer to this question depends on the status of a Lassiter
violation. The Lassiter Court held that it is a due process violation to
deny counsel in a termination hearing when "the parent's interest [is] at
[its] strongest, the State's interests [are] at their weakest, and the risks
of error [are] at their peak. 68 Because denial of counsel in such cases
is a constitutional violation, appellate courts turn to the Supreme Court
decision of Arizona v. Fulminante,69 which articulated the criteria for
determining the standard of review of federal constitutional errors.
As noted above; the reversal per se standard is the simplest to
apply.7° Under this standard, any child protection or termination case
in which a parent is denied his Lassiter due process right to counsel
would be reversed. Fulminante's narrow prescription for using the
reversal per se standard in constitutional violation cases, however,
insufferably complicates the issue. The Fulminante Court held that a
reversal per se standard applies only to errors which are "structural de-
fects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, [which] defy analysis
by harmless-error standards."'" It applies, therefore, only to consti-
tutional deprivations "affecting the framework within which the trial
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.' '72 As
the Court maintained, "[s]tructural defects have two essential charac-
teristics. First, it is extremely difficult to determine whether such
errors actually prejudiced the defendant. Second, such errors affect
the structural integrity of the trial in a systemic manner. 73
67. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for a listing of these considerations.
68. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
69. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
70. See supra part I1.B.I.
7 1. Fulninante, 499 U.S. at 280.
72. Id. at 309.
73. Craig Goldblatt, Disentangling Webb: Governmental Intimidation of Defense
Witnesses and Harmless Error Analysis, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (1992). If "the
particular error under consideration is rarely susceptible to harmless error analysis or if
the error is rarely harmless, a bright line rule should apply." Ogletree, supra note 59, at
164.
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Although the Court in Fulminante determined that denial of counsel
in a criminal case is a structural defect so detrimental to the "consti-
tution of the trial mechanism" that reversal per se is appropriate in
every instance, 74 state courts have had considerable difficulty in decid-
ing whether denial of counsel in child protection and parental sever-
ance trials is also a structural defect requiring reversal per se.75 Be-
cause one of the attributes of structural errors is, their "systemic"
infection of an entire proceeding, state courts have often combined the
questions of whether denial of counsel in child protection cases is a
structural error with the question of whether the denial of counsel oc-
curred at a "critical stage" in the proceeding.76 In Illinois, for example,
appellate courts have held that adjudicatory hearings, in which the
issue is whether the child was abused or neglected, are a critical stage
where a parent has a constitutional right to counsel, because the evi-
dence presented in an adjudicatory hearing can adversely affect a pa-
rent's efforts to defend his parental rights in a subsequent termination
proceeding.77
The most complicated series of cases has arisen in California be-
cause of a radical change in the statutory makeup of dependency hear-
ings and parental severance trials.78 Until 1989, California bifurcated
the issues of child protection (known as "dependency" in California)
and parental severance into two different courts and two independent
cases; the juvenile court determined dependency and the superior court
determined termination. 79 Today, however, both actions are consoli-
dated into a series of hearings in the juvenile court. 8° California courts
74. Fulninante, 499 U.S. at 309-10; see Goldblatt, supra note 73, at 1240; Ogletree,
supra note 59, at 160.
75. See, e.g., In re Andrew S., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1408 (1995).
76. See, e.g., id.; Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 851 P.2d 1307 (Cal. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1221 (1994); White v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs.,
483 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
77. See, e.g., In re KR.K, 631 N.E.2d 449 (11. App. Ct. 1994).
78. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 361, 366, 366.21-366.26 (West 1995).
79. In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1826
(1995):
An action pursuant to Civil Code former section 232 [termination of parental
rights hearing] is an independent proceeding in the superior court . . . . The
proceeding has a different purpose than the dependency proceedings. It is
intended to pave the way for adoption or other permanent conclusive
placement . . . . Unlike the statutory scheme applicable in dependencies
established after January I, 1989, the § 232 action does not function as a
review of the proceedings in the juvenile court.
Id. (citations omitted).
80. For a lengthy analysis of the new California statutory scheme which unites
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have found this procedural distinction significant in determining the
extent of due process rights afforded parties in dependency court."'
For instance, the California Supreme Court in Cynthia D. v.
Superior Court held that the selection and implementation hearing pro-
vided under the new California Welfare & Institutions Code section
366.26, at which the final determination of whether to terminate paren-
tal rights occurs, does not require under Santosky v. Kramer 82 a
finding of unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. 3 In Santosky,
the United States Supreme Court used the three factors set down in
Matthews v. Eldridge8 4 to hold that "[b]efore a State may sever com-
pletely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due
process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear
and convincing evidence. ' 5  The California Supreme Court, in
Cynthia D., reasoned that "[t]he California dependency statutes, by
contrast [to the New York statutes reviewed in Santosky], provide the
parents a much more level playing field., 8 6 Unlike in New York, pa-
rents in California retain statutorily appointed counsel who continue to
represent them throughout the dependency proceedings even after a
court has denied counsel pursuant to a Lassiter hearing.87 Addition-
ally, parents continue to have access to all relevant records, and are
entitled to a series of review hearings within which they can demon-
strate their capacity to care for their child. 8 Recalling the additional
protections provided the parent under the California dependency
statute, the court in Cynthia D. held that "[a]t this late stage in the
process the evidence of detriment [to the child if it remains with the
parent] is already so clear and convincing ... [that] proof by a pre-
ponderance standard is sufficient at this point" to permanently sever
dependency and termination cases into a single sequence of hearings in the same court
versus the old two court model, see Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 851 P.2d 1307 (Cal.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1221 (1994). "Senate Bill No. 243 substantially
changed the procedure for permanently severing parental rights in cases where the child
is a dependent of the court. It eliminated the need to file a separate Civil Code section
232 proceeding and brought termination of parental rights for dependent children within
the dependency process . Id. at 1309. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.21-
366.26 (West 1995).
81. See, e.g., it re Andrew S., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1408 (1995); Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1307.
82. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
83. Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1313.
84. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
85. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768 (emphasis added).
86. Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1314; see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768 (finding the
New York statute unconstitutional).
87. Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1314.
88. Id.
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the parental rights.89 Thus, the court in Cynthia D. justified its appli-
cation of a lower standard of review because parental severance hear-
ings were not what the court considered to be critical stages in the pro-
ceedings.
The Cynthia D. "critical stage" analysis was applied to the right of
counsel issue at the section 366.26 hearing in In re Andrew S. 90 In In
re Andrew S., the mother's counsel requested that he be relieved be-
cause the mother was uncooperative. 9' The trial court granted the
motion and severed the mother's parental rights, finding that the
"mother had purposefully absented herself from the hearing., 92 On
appeal, the court stated that denial of counsel "[olrdinarily... would
be what Chief Justice Rehnquist has described as a 'structural defect'
in the trial of the case and, as such, reversible per se. '93 However,
relying on Cynthia D., the court maintained that a section 366.26 hear-
ing is not a critical phase of the dependency proceedings and the right
to counsel "is not a right of constitutional dimension." 94 The court de-
termined that the same appellate standard applicable to abuse of dis-
cretion applies to the denial of counsel at the section 366.26 termi-
nation hearing: the denial of counsel "must be reviewed under article
VI, section 13 of the California Constitution and the error is not re-
versible unless it is shown to be prejudicial. 95
The Cynthia D. and Andrew S. rationale for denying constitutional
due process protection to parents in the final section 366.26 termi-
nation hearing leads to interesting results when applied to the entire
series of California dependency hearings. First, as Justice Kennard
89. Id. at 1315 (emphasis added). The court also indicated that in cases where the
child is adoptable and reunification services have been provided to the parents, "the
decision to terminate parental rights will be relatively automatic." Id. at 1311 (quoting
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN & YOUTH, SB 1195 TASK FORCE REP. ON CHILD ABUSE
REPORTING LAWS, JUVENILE COURT DEPENDENCY STATUTES, AND CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
11 (1988)).
90. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670 (Ct. App. 1994).
91. Id. at 673.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 674.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 675. The court found that the mother's interests at the § 366.26 hearing
were not as strong as the minor's, because all the mother could do was object to adoptive
placement or show a change of circumstance enabling the mother to again regain
custody. Id. The delay in reversing the case for lack of counsel would cause additional
delay in a hearing whose purpose is to finalize the long-term placement of the child. Id.
The court in In re Marquis D., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198 (Ct. App. 1995), held that when
determining the initial denial of placement with a noncustodial parent pursuant to CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995), the minimal standard of proof
is clear and convincing evidence, not a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 208.
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noted in her dissenting opinion in Cynthia D., at some point during the
entire termination process, Santosky and the Due Process Clause re-
quire a finding by clear and convincing evidence that parental unfitness
necessitates parental termination.96 Thus, the real question under
Santosky is how to define the minimal temporal nexus between a find-
ing of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence and the final
decision to terminate parental rights. For example, in California there
may be a period of approximately twenty-four months between the ini-
tial determination that a child was abused or neglected and a subse-
quent determination that such abuse requires out-of-home placement
and parental termination. 97 Under such circumstances, will a two-
year-old clear and convincing finding of parental unfitness survive
Santosky's concern regarding potentially erroneous fact finding if the
basis of the section 366.26 termination is that same two-year-old find-
ing of unfitness? 98
Not only did the court in Cynthia D. underestimate the importance
of the assistance of counsel at the section 366.26 hearing, but the court
ignored Lassiter's concern regarding the interrelationship between de-
pendency and criminal trials based upon the same allegations of child
abuse. It is possible that the parent appearing without counsel in the
dependency hearing is at risk of damaging his case in a parallel crimi-
nal trial. Considering the steady increase in the number of child abuse
cases criminally prosecuted in the last decade, this possibility is all the
more alarming. 99
96. Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1320 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard also
rejected the majority's statement that parents have a "much more level playing field"
than under the New York system because, as she pointed out, the State has custody of the
child. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Further, the "potential for class or cultural bias in a
decision that will result in freeing a child for adoption by a family with greater resources
than the natural parents is no less acute in California than in New York." Id. (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
97. See CALIF. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366, 366.21-366.26 (West 1995).
98. The California Welfare & Institutions Code § 361(b) provides: "No dependent
child shall be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents or guardian or
guardians with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated unless the
juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence" of statutory grounds for separating
parent and child. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361(b) (West 1995). The subsequent six-
month reviews are based upon a preponderance of the evidence, not a clear and
convincing evidence standard. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.21 (West 1995).
99. See William W. Patton, Child Abuse: The Irreconcilable Differences Between
Criminal Prosecution and Informal Dependency Court Mediation, 31 UNIV. LOUISVILLE J.
FAM. L. 37, 39-45 (1992-93) [hereinafter Patton, Child Abuse]; William W. Patton, The
World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 GA. L. REV. 473, 473
(1990) [hereinafter Patton, Parallel Lines].
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Similar concerns arise in analyzing the constitutional right to counsel
under Lassiter. If a parent is not entitled to counsel at the section
366.26 termination hearing, then at what point in the ongoing pro-
ceedings must counsel be appointed? In In re Tanya H.,' °° the second
district of the California appellate court held that it was error to
abrogate a parent's statutory right to continued assistance of appointed
counsel in all dependency proceedings based upon the system's claim
of economic necessity.'0 ' But most importantly, the court in In re
Tanya H. held that stripping counsel from a parent at any stage of the
proceeding would severely undermine the rationale of Cynthia D. 's
"much more level playing field" model, which justified retrenchment
from the prophylactic protection of Santosky's clear and convincing
evidence standard.'0 2 In other words, the state cannot have it both
ways; it cannot collapse the old model of separate court trials for de-
pendency and severance proceedings into a single system that evis-
cerates prior due process protections.0 3
The court's reasoning in Cynthia D. simply does not withstand
scrutiny when a parent is denied a Lassiter right to counsel at any time
during the dependency or severance proceedings. For example, the
court in In re Arturo A.'o4 held that parents may have a constitutional
right to competent counsel in dependency proceedings "which have the
potential of terminating reunification services and setting a section
366.26 hearing."'0 5 Therefore, in those situations where Lassiter re-
quires that counsel be appointed, the Andrew S. rationale regarding
"structural error" is inapplicable and the reversal per se standard of
Fulminante should apply.'°6 Therefore, if parents were denied counsel
100. 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 503 (Ct. App. 1993).
101. Id. at 507. The California Welfare & Institutions Code § 317 (d) provides:
The counsel appointed by the court shall represent the parent, guardian, or
minor at the detention hearing and at all subsequent proceedings before the
juvenile court. Counsel shall continue to represent the parent or minor unless
relieved by the court upon the substitution of other counsel or for cause. The
representation shall include representing the parent or the minor in
termination proceedings and in those proceedings relating to the institution
or setting aside of a legal guardianship.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(d) (West 1995).
102. In re Tanya H., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 503, 507-08 (Ct. App. 1993).
103. See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
104. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131 (Ct. App. 1992).
105. Id. at 136. The Arturo A. court stated that a termination of parental rights
petition pursuant to § 366.26 is dependent "on the determination that the child should
not be returned to the custody of the parent. This latter determination is made not at the
section 366.26 hearing but at the prior section 366.21 or'366.22 hearing." Id.
106. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of Andrew S.; see
also supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fulminante
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or received incompetent counsel in the dependency hearing, appellate
counsel should argue for reversal. The finding by a mere prepon-
derance of the evidence violates Santosky because the Cynthia D.
rationale for lowering the burden of proof was predicated in great part
on the parent receiving the assistance of counsel to level the playing
field against the state's tremendous resources.107
Other state courts disagree with the Cynthia D. conclusion that only
some aspects of the dependency proceedings are "critical stages." For
instance, in White v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative.
Services,'08 a Florida court described the interrelationships and inter-
dependence of each stage of the dependency proceedings leading to pa-
rental termination:
[O]ften, as here, dependency disposition hearings and
dependency disposition orders are not final hearings and final
orders in the cause but adjudicate dependency, place temporary
custody of the child with H.R.S., and order the parents to enter
into a performance agreement which, when unperformed, leads
directly to, and in combination with the adjudicated facts
underlying the original dependency petition and order, is the
basis for a later petition for termination of parental rights. In
this situation the petition for termination of parental rights is,
and is treated as, but another stage or continuation of the
original dependency proceeding rather than as the initiation of
a new (permanent termination) proceeding to be procedurally
subdivided again into .. .[different stages]. This merging of
the original dependency proceeding with the later permanent
commitment proceeding, and the merging of the adjudicatory
and disposition stages of the permanent commitment
proceeding, result in confusion and substantive legal errors.1 0 9
The White court stated somewhat sarcastically that "[t]o be effective,
counsel must be afforded at the earliest critical stage of any proceeding
... . There is no need to appoint counsel at the gallows' foot."'' 0
The court held that because the parents did not have counsel when they
reversal per se standard.
107. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Santosky. See
also supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cynthia D.
108. 483 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
109. Id. at 865 (emphasis added). See also In re M.D.A., 517 So. 2d 711, 712 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988). The court commented on the problem of timing, finding that "by
the time counsel was appointed for the father, any prejudice accruing from the absence of
counsel had set in because, of course, the final review at which the termination hearing
occurs involves the proceedings that have transpired from the commencement of the
matter." Id.
I 10. White, 483 So. 2d at 866.
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were asked to plead to the dependency allegations which resulted in a
finding of wardship and the entering of "a dispositional order requiring
the parents to enter into a performance agreement," those uncounseled
proceedings should not be used as any part of the proceeding to
permanently terminate parental rights."' Thus, the court reversed the
trial court and held that the parents were entitled to counsel at every
stage of the dependency proceeding which "contributed and led direct-
ly to the permanent termination of parental rights."' 12 Several other
jurisdictions agree that judges may not rely upon records of hearings
where parents were uncounseled." 3
3. The Speculative Nature of Harmless Error Analysis
as Applied to Denial of Counsel
Those courts that have rejected the Fulminante analogy, holding that
either there is no constitutional right to counsel in dependency cases or
that a lesser standard of review is applicable, have frequently turned to
variations of the harmless error rule in fashioning a remedy."l4 Apply-
ing harmless error analysis, however, has severely confused courts:
"Chaos surrounds the standard for appellate review .... Over the past
century, courts have employed a variety of rules and presumptions in
an effort to find an ordering principle to resolve the harmless error
issue." ' The real question is which of the numerous harmless error
11. Id.
1 12. Id. at 867. See also In re J.B., 702 P.2d 753 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985), where the
court held that review hearings are "an important proceeding to parties ... [which] may
form a foundation for and presage the filing of a motion for termination of the parent-
child relationship." Id. at 754.
113. In In re D.S., 833 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Mont. 1992), the court held that a trial
court could not judicially notice a hearing where the parents did not have counsel. In in
re J.B., 624 So. 2d 792, 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), the court held that it "cannot be
deemed harmless error since that dependency adjudication was used as a basis of the
adjudication of the permanent termination of appellant's parental rights," even though
appellant had not been informed of the right to appointed counsel. But see In re
Grannis, 680 P.2d 660, 665 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), where the court determined that failure
to appoint counsel for the parent was harmless error since the earlier hearings were not
critical and she had counsel at critical stages.
114. See, e.g., Grannis, 680 P.2d 660.
115. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973).
The area of standards of review continues to become more complicated as the United
States Supreme Court continues to articulate different standards for reviewing identical
issues dependent on'whether they are filed as direct appeals or writs. See, e.g., Schlup v.
Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 867 (1995) (stating that the defendant must demonstrate "that 'a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent"') (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)); Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842-43 n.2 (1993) ("[A]n error of constitutional magnitude
occurs in the Sixth Amendment context only if the defendant demonstrates (1) deficient
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standard variants should be applied to denial of counsel in child pro-
tection and parental severance hearings.
The typical standard of appellate review consists of two basic com-
ponents. 6 First, it determines which party will carry the burden of
persuasion."17 Second, it establishes the degree of proof necessary to
obtain judicial relief from alleged error. 8 The harmless error rule ex-
pands on these two elements and should contain at least four elements:
(1) who bears the burden of proof to show that the error is or is
not harmless; (2) what that burden is; (3) what the requisite
standard of 'prejudice' is (i.e., how likely it is that the error did
or did not affect the verdict); and (4) what 'approach' the
reviewing court must take to evaluate whether prejudice has
been demonstrated." 19
a. Three Approaches to Harmless Error Analysis
The federal courts have devised three basic tests to determine
whether an error is harmless. 20 Under the first test, set forth by the
performance [by counsel] and (2) prejudice."); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710,
1714 (1993) (defining tie proper standard as "whether the ... error 'had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict"') (quoting Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
This Article discusses harmless error in relation to direct appeals rather than collateral
attacks. Thus, courts' concerns about federalism, comity, state exhaustion, and
tardiness will not be discussed. For information on these concerns see Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's' Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 512 (1982) ("Federalism
concerns and the exceptional need for finality in child-custody disputes argue strongly
against the grant of Ms. Lehman's petition."); Zamora-Trevino v. Barton, 727 F. Supp.
589, 591-92 (D. Kan. 1989) (finding an exception to Lehman in international custody
disputes); Mauro B. v. Superior Court, 281 Cal. Rptr. 507, 509 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating
that writs are disfavored in cases involving the custody of children). But see Ex Parte
James, 240 P.2d 596, 600 (Cal. 1952) (holding that writ was appropriate to challenge
denial of counsel).
1 16. William W. Patton, It Matters Not What Is But What Might Have Been: The
Standard of Appellate Review for Denial of Counsel in Child Dependency and Parental
Severance Trials, 12 WHITrIER L. REV. 537, 541 (1991) [hereinafter Patton, Appellate
Review].
1 17. Id. at 541.
118. id. "The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due
Process Clause and in the realm of fact finding, is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning
the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication."' Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
119. John H. Blume & Stephen P. Garvey, Harmless Error In Federal Habeas Corpus
After Brecht -v. Abrahamson, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 165-66 (1993). See also
Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process
in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 16 (1976).
120. Gregory Mitchell, Against "Overwhelming" Appellate Activism: Constraining
Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1341-52 (1994). 1 am deeply indebted to
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Supreme Court in Chapman v. California,12 1 "an error is not harmless
if it is likely to have had even a minimal impact on juror deliber-
ations."'' 22 Under Chapman, "the state must show lack of prejudice by
demonstrating that there was no 'reasonable possibility' that the error
'contributed to the verdict. '"1 23 Because the Chapman test has a very
narrow factual determination "confined to assessing whether the jury's
guilty verdict could not reasonably have been influenced by the
error,"' 24 it best supports a model of judicial economy and requires the
least investigation by the court. 25
The second test for harmless error is described in Harrington v.
California:126 "[A]n error is harmless if overwhelming, untainted evi-
dence of guilt exists in the trial record."' 127 The Harrington analysis is
less circumscribed than Chapman. 28 Under Harrington, a court
"assesses guilt in general, rather than trying to conclude what effect an
error may have had on a jury."'129 However, a finding of sufficiency
of the evidence is not sufficient to support a conclusion that the error
was harmless. 3 °
The Supreme Court articulated the final test in Delaware v. Van
Arsdall.3' Under the Van Arsdall test, a "court balances the impact of
the error against the overwhelmingness of the untainted evidence. The
outcome will rely on either the severity of the error or the weight of the
untainted evidence ....,,32 Unfortunately, however, the Van Arsdall
Court "failed to specify how slight the impact of the error or how great
the untainted evidence must be before error is deemed harmless."''
33
Nevertheless, the Van Arsdall Court delineated several variables which
should be calculated in determining harmlessness: (1) the importance
Mr. Mitchell's article for the following discussion of the three variants of the harmless
error rule.
121. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
122. Mitchell, supra note 120, at 1339. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 34
(1967).
123. Blume & Garvey, supra note 119, at 170.
124. Mitchell, supra note 120, at 1357.
125. Id. at 1357, 1361; see also Mause, supra note 44, at 529-30.
126. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
127. Mitchell, supra note 120, at 1339. See Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254.
128. Mitchell, supra note 120, at 1357.
129. Id. Harrington thus requires much more court investigation because its
"overwhelming-evidence test directs attention away from the error to the weight of the
supposedly unaffected evidence." Id. at 1361.
130. Id. at 1352.
131. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
132. Mitchell, supra note 120, at 1339.
133. Id. at 1360.
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of a witness' testimony; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3)
whether it was corroborating or contradicting evidence; (4) the extent
of cross examination; and (5) the overall strength of the case."3
Which harmless error test a court applies may be dispositive of the
outcome of the case. One study of cases applying harmless error de-
termined that those courts using the Chapman harmless error standard
found the error harmless in only 5.9% of the cases; however, courts
applying the Harrington test declared the errors harmless 100% of the
time; and courts analyzing the errors under the Van Arsdall hybrid test
found 70.6% harmless. 135
b. State Application of Harmless Error Analysis
This brings us to our central question: in jurisdictions that reject
Fulminante's reversal per se standard, 136 which of the several harmless
error tests should be adopted in determining the effect of a denial of
counsel? State courts have been applying variants of the harmless
error tests without analyzing or articulating why they have selected one
approach over another. 37 Furthermore, one of the most troubling
aspects of harmless error analysis as applied to dependency cases is
that the courts often place the burden on the parent or child to demon-
strate that the error was harmful, rather than placing the burden on the
state to demonstrate the error was harmless. 38 This flies in the face of
decades of harmless error cases which have found that the burden of
proving harmlessness should be on the state. 39
Indeed, placing the burden of proving harmful error on parents or
children works a great inequity. 4 ° The inequity stretches far beyond
134. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.
135. Mitchell, supra note 120, at 1349-50.
136. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reversal
per se standard set forth in Fulminante.
137. See Mitchell, supra note 120, at 1348-1350 (discussing the difficulty involved
even in discovering what harmless error test a state court has employed because state
opinions do not often contain clear analysis of this issue).
138. In In re Christine P., 277 Cal. Rptr. 290, 298 (Ct. App.) (holding that "a parent
must demonstrate on appeal that the absence of counsel made a 'determinative difference'
and 'render[ed] the proceedings fundamentally unfair"') (citing Lassiter v. Department of
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981)), vacated, 808 P.2d 1181 (Cal. 1991). For an
extensive discussion of In re Christine P., see Patton, Appellate Review, supra note
115, at 543-49.
139. Mitchell, supra note 119, at 1338 n.22.
140. In re Richard E., 579 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal; Ct. App. 1978). See also In re
Melissa S., 225 Cal. Rptr. 195, 203 (Ct. App. 1985) (reversing the lower court for
failing to appoint independent counsel for a minor because "[tihere is a reasonable
probability a result more favorable to the mother would have been reached absent the
error"); Smith v. Marion County Dep't of Public Welfare, 635 N.E.2d 1144, 1149 (Ind.
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the initial stages of the process. 4' First, appellants will have already
had to meet the Lassiter burden of demonstrating that a constitutional
deprivation occurred before the court will even consider whether harm-
less error analysis is applicable. 142 Second, if the state did not provide
counsel at a termination hearing, it is unlikely that they will provide ap-
pellate counsel. Therefore, a parent would likely have to prove that
appointment of counsel would have changed the outcome of the pro-
ceeding without the assistance of counsel. Placing the burden on pa-
rents and children is as unfair as forcing them to suffer a dependency
trial without counsel:
A reviewing court could obtain the missing information by
imposing on a defendant the burden of producing evidence
showing how counsel would have made a difference. But this
anomalous burden of production would require that an
uncounseled defendant articulate how counsel could have
helped him when his ignorance of what counsel could have
done is the reason for requiring counsel to begin with.
143
Finally, harmless error analysis has traditionally placed the burden on
the party gaining an advantage from the constitutional deprivation:
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that to demonstrate sufficient prejudice from denial of counsel
to support reversal, the appellant must prove "the termination hearing would have
produced a different result, had she been represented by counsel at the [earlier Child In
Need of Service] hearing"); In re Hall, 469 N.W.2d 56, 58-59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(stating that the court "fail[ed] to see, and respondent has failed to indicate, how she was
prejudiced by the absence of counsel at the earlier review hearing"). But see In re Richard
H., 285 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting the In re Melissa S. standard:
"[W]e conclude that the standard of review for the failure to appoint separate counsel for
a minor at a disposition hearing should be whether the record reflects a miscarriage of
justice."); In re Patricia E., 219 Cal. Rptr. 783, 787 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a
different standard applies in determining prejudice from a conflict of interest between a
child and counsel; noting that reversal is mandated where the record supports "'an
informed speculation' that appellant's right to effective representation was prejudicially
affected") (quoting People v. Mroczko, 197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 63 (1983)).
141. Should parents and children be able to introduce statistics demonstrating that
more favorable results generally- occur if represented in dependency court? A 1967 study
found "[plarties who were represented by counsel were three times more likely to have
their cases dismissed . . . .[T]he largest percentage of the dismissals occurred in
dependency cases rather than delinquency cases." Marc B. Stahl, The hnpact Of Counsel
On Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 84 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 642, 647-48 n.28
(1993) (reviewing BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND
THE JUVENILE COURTS (1993)).
142. See Jonathan H. Levy, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and Argument After
Payne v. Tennessee, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (1993): "Chapman's two-prong
approach to claims of constitutional error first determines whether a constitutional
violation has taken place. Only if the reviewing court finds such a violation does it ask
a second question: Does the violation require reversal?" Id.
143. Tom Stacey & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 79, 93 (1988).
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Since the appellate court under Lassiter will have determined
that a parent should have been provided counsel based upon
either the parent's mental infirmity, the difficulty of the law or
facts involved, or the necessity of skill in examining expert
witnesses, it is clear that the state will have benefited from the
error and that the trial lacked the necessary component of a fair
balance of power. 144
In determining the appropriate standard of review for denial of
counsel in child protection cases, few state courts have considered or
adopted the Chapman variant of harmless error, which holds that "the
appropriate standard of prejudice is the harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt standard."'' 45 Instead, many courts have used the quality and
sufficiency of evidence presented at the hearing as a dispositive factor
and rendered opinions more consistent with the Harrington test. 146
For example, in In the Matter of D.S., a Montana court held that even
though the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of an earlier de-
pendency hearing where the parent had been denied counsel, the error
was not reversible because there was sufficient independent evidence
presented. 47 However, the dissent stated that the "[s]ubstantiality of
evidence has never been an adequate reason to sustain a violation of an
individual's right to counsel."'' 4' The court in In the Matter of D.S.
reduced the Harrington test from a showing of "overwhelming, un-
tainted evidence" to one of mere "sufficiency of evidence," thus
dramatically lowering the state's burden of showing that the error was
harmless. However, the Supreme Court has frequently rejected a suf-
ficiency of the evidence standard when applied to constitutional
violations.
149
Finally, some courts have applied a test similar to Van Arsdall,
which balances the weight of untainted evidence and the severity of the
144. Patton, Appellate Review, supra note 116, at 547.
145. In In re Laura H., the court noted that an ordinary "miscarriage of justice"
standard was inappropriate in parental termination cases and stated, without specifically
deciding, that the "appropriate standard of prejudice is the harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt standard" of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). In re Laura H., II
Cal. Rptr. 2d 285, 289 (Ct. App. 1992).
146. However, some courts have found it "inappropriate to address the issues of
whether sufficient evidence was introduced to support the order terminating respondent's
rights or whether adequate factual findings were placed on the record." In re Keifer, 406
N.W.2d 217, 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
147. In re D.S., 833 P.2d 1090 (Mont. 1992).
148. Id. at 1094 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
149. Mitchell, supra note 120, at 1359-60 n.139; see also United States v. Lane, 474
U.S. 438, 477-78 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (distinguishing the
sufficiency of the evidence standard from the harmless error standard).
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error. In In re J.J.B.,5 ° a Kansas court surveyed the quality of evi-
dence presented in a case where parents were not granted appointed
counsel. Although the court determined "significant substantial evi-
dence was presented in support of the severance petition," it reversed
and remanded the case after balancing the seriousness of the depri-
vation of counsel: 5' "Balanced against [the quality of evidence
presented] is the difficulty in calculating the prejudice caused by the
lack of counsel .... [D]uring this time the rights of the parents were
not being safeguarded by counsel, with unknown and unknowable
ramifications."'' 52 However, a California court in In re Richard E.,"'
applied a Van Arsdall-like test with different results. After finding
"substantial evidence" to support parental termination, the court deter-
mined that the denial of appointment of individual counsel was harm-
less because the appellant did not suggest how separate counsel would
have provided more due process. 54
Even though state courts are applying harmless error tests similar to
Chapman, Van Arsdall, and Harrington, they have been doing so
without thoroughly analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each of
the tests in relation to child abuse and neglect cases. For several rea-
sons the Harrington standard is the worst test for judging whether
denial of counsel in those cases should be held reversible error. First,
denial of counsel is a structural error infecting the entire proceeding,
the scope and effect of which is almost incalculable; "[t]he impact of a
structural error . . . cannot be so readily isolated or confidently as-
sessed."' 55 Moreover, the Harrington test focuses almost exclusively
150. 818 P.2d 1179 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
151. Id. at 1184.
152. Id.
153. 579 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1978).
154. Id. at 499. Richard E. involved a slightly different procedural context in that
the alleged error was failure to appoint separate counsel for the minor in the termination
hearing pursuant to CAL. CIV. CODE § 237.5 (West 1976), which provided discretionary
appointment of separate counsel for minors. Failure to appoint separate counsel fits
conceptually between two other due process models: (1) failure to appoint counsel at all;
and (2) appointment of incompetent counsel. Depending on the facts of the case, failure
to appoint independent counsel is worse than having no counsel at all because the court
will assume that counsel represents the interests of the minor, even though an inherent
conflict of interest prevents counsel from arguing zealously the minor's case. Failure to
appoint independent counsel is sometimes like incompetence of counsel if counsel fails
to present all the relevant evidence and defenses for all the clients the lawyer is
attempting to represent. If the conflict of interest is significant, the prejudice to the
misrepresented client may be as great as having a case heard by a biased judge, a
structural error recognized in a dissent by Fulminante as requiring reversal per se.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 290 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
155. Blume & Garvey, supra note 119, at 185.
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upon the strength of the evidence rather than the egregiousness of the
violation in denying counsel and fails to properly account for the effect
of that error. Harrington devalues the creativity of counsel in fact in-
vestigation, direct and cross examination, and advocacy skills.' 56
Further, if a court adopting a Harrington test also shifts the burden to
the parent or child to prove harm, a draconian standard evolves. Prov-
ing prejudice from structural error places "an insurmountable burden
on a lay parent to provide the court with not only the different methods
of representation that counsel would have provided," but also fre-
quently requires the parent to demonstrate the reasonable probability
that a different result would have occurred if counsel had been ap-
pointed. 5 7 Finally, the Harrington test should be rejected because it
devalues the nature of the right to counsel and ameliorates and
mollifies the state's egregious conduct; it does not look at the state's
violation of a child's or parent's rights so much as the degree of proof
presented. Underlying this shift of emphasis from Chapman's con-
cern regarding the constitutional violation to Harrington's focus on the
strength of evidence presented is a systemic bias indicating that it is
more important to have finality for children than to be sure that the
findings supporting that finality were accurate and based upon a
complete record. However, "[c]an it be said that it is in the best
interest of a child to be taken from the accustomed custody and control
of his or her parents when there has not been a fair hearing related to
the need for such intervention?"'5 8
The Van Arsdall approach, although not as unfair as the Harrington
test, is also an unwise choice in dependency cases because it sub-
stantially burdens the appellate court in conducting extensive fact in-
vestigation. "The Chapman test generally requires less investigation
than the Harrington test, which in turn generally requires less investi-
gation than the Van Arsdall test."' 59 For two reasons, the extensive
fact investigation inherent in the Van Arsdall test will lead to longer
delays in reaching certainty and finality in dependency cases."6 First,
156. See Saltzburg, supra note 115, at 990. Saltzburg notes that "[olne reason it is
so difficult to judge accurately the impact of error is that little empirical data is available
about trial strategy." Id. In recent years authors have analyzed the creativity and
sophistication of fact investigation, and entire conceptual systems have been developed
which dwarf court's conceptions of the role of counsel in investigating and representing
clients. See DAVID BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION FROM HYPOTHESIS TO
PROOF 28 (1984).
157. Patton, Appellate Review, supra note 116, at 545.
158. In re Emilye A., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 301 n.9 (Ct. App. 1992).
159. Mitchell, supra note 120, at 1361.
160. Jeffrey Butts and Gregory Halemba have observed that delays in processing
dispositions in juvenile delinquency cases adversely affect adolescents because they "are
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the already overburdened appellate courts will find it difficult to find
time to expedite review if they have to focus so closely on an analysis
of all the facts. 6 ' Second, since the review Will involve a great deal of
speculation regarding what appointed counsel might have done, ap-
pellate counsel will invariably need to file writs in order to bring
evidence which is not part of the record below before the court, thus
dramatically increasing the costs of appellate services. For instance,
appellate counsel may need to depose dependency experts regarding
additional motions, theories, or arguments which might have been
presented. Appellate counsel may also conduct new fact investigation
such as interviewing witnesses who were not called in the original
dependency hearing to demonstrate that with counsel the parent or
child could have presented critically relevant evidence which may have
affected the court's decision. The time demands and expense of the
Van Arsdall approach outweigh any benefits of its balancing test.
The Fulminante reversal per se standard is obviously the least ex-
pensive to administer: "A bright line rule of automatic reversal ... is
preferable because the costs of judicial inquiry [of harmless error ana-
lysis] are more substantial . ...,1 However, in those jurisdictions
which reject the Fulminante reversal per se standard in dependency
reviews, the second best choice is the Chapman standard. It is quick
and inexpensive, does not require writs to supplement the record,
properly places the burden on the party benefiting from the error, and
less capable than adults of anticipating the future consequences of their behavior" and
because "every day a juvenile disposition is delayed means one less day the juvenile
justice system has to work with the youth." Jeffrey A. Butts & Gregory Halemba, Delays
in Juvenile Justice: Findings from a National Survey, 45 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 31, 32-33
(1994). The same can be said of delays in dependency court. Children need finality in
order to have psychological closure; the juvenile court needs to conserve its meager
resources to promote family reunification if possible, and if not, to provide permanent
stability for the children under its jurisdiction. Lengthy appeals will only strain the
rehabilitative funds and frustrate finality.
161. Henry P. Monaghan, Taking the Courts of Appeals Seriously, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,
reprinted in 114 F.R.D. 419, 576, 582 (1986) (finding that a backlog of cases may lead
to a decline in the quality of appellate decisions). Of course, the appellate court case
backlog is only half the story. If the appellate court decides to remand the case, it will
again enter a terribly overcrowded trial court system. For instance, in Los Angeles
"[albout 75,000 civil cases are filed ... each year." Stephanie Simon, Civil Courts Also
Feel Squeeze of '3 Strikes' Cases, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, at Al. There are currently
so many criminal court filings that the civil judges "have had to scrap civil cases
midstream and declare mistrials to make room for urgent criminal matters." Id. at A24.
The civil justice system is experiencing a double explosion. In Los Angeles in 1994
civil judges had to handle 800 criminal trials, while civil case filings such as domestic
violence cases increased by 60% in one year. Id.
162. Ogletree, supra note 59, at 167.
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does not involve the speculation required of Harrington and Van
Arsdall regarding the effect of a denial of counsel.
4. The Degree of Proof Required
The proponents of a lesser burden of proof to demonstrate harm-
lessness are beginning to debate again an idea I rejected in 1991. The
proponents argue that since denial of counsel in dependency cases is
not as egregious as Sixth Amendment denial of counsel in criminal
cases, the burden of proof to demonstrate harmlessness should be
clear and convincing evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 163 As I earlier argued:
Much of the Santosky rationale for requiring only a clear and
convincing standard for the parental termination hearing was
based upon the Court's, recognition that the adversarial process
pitted equally represented parties. The Court noted that
"parents have a statutory right to the assistance of counsel" and
further noted that in the "adversary contest ... [t]he State, the
parents, and the child are all represented by counsel."
[T]herefore, where the parent is not represented by counsel and
the appellate court finds Lassiter error, the argument set out in
Santosky for a standard less stringent than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt loses its underpinnings.' 64
Maintaining the requirement of proving harmlessness beyond a rea-
sonable doubt will not impose "substantial fiscal burdens on the state"
and will provide parties, the court, and the public with confidence that
the dependency judgment was not based upon factual error, undiscov-
ered evidence, or an adversarial advantage by the state over an indigent
uncounseled parent.
163. Patton, Appellate Review, supra note 116, at 548-49. Gary Seiser, Deputy
Counsel for the County of San Diego, argues that the burden in dependency cases should
depend on the nature of the denial of counsel; in some circumstances "it may well be that
even a violation of the constitutional right to competent counsel should be measured by
a preponderance of the evidence harmless error standard." Gary Seiser, Legal
Developments in Children's Emerging Trends and Issues, Spring 1995, at 28 (handout
prepared for Center for Judicial Education and Research Conference; copy on file at
Whittier Law Library).
164. Patton, Appellate Review, supra note 116, at 548 (citing Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 749 (1982)). Note that most modern courts' interpretations of entire de-
pendency statutory schemes have been skewed by the notion that parents will have
counsel. For instance, the California Supreme Court in Cynthia D. permitted a finding
by a preponderance because counsel provided parents a more level playing field.
Cynthia D. v. Superior Ct., 851 P.2d 1307, 1320-21 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1221 (1994). Without counsel the balance substantially shifts to the state and fact
finding becomes much less complete and accurate. A higher standard of proof is
therefore needed to ensure fairness and accuracy.
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III. REVIEWING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL IN DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION TRIALS
Consider for a moment the effectiveness of counsel like that
appointed to represent the parents in In re Prough in the intro-
duction.'65 The Proughs' attorney was so passive that they may have
been better off representing themselves. For the right to counsel to
have substance, the right must necessarily include a guarantee of com-
petent assistance. This Part will address how various courts have
handled the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, first discussing
how systemic bias has led courts to resist such claims. Then this Part
will determine the scope of the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Finally, the Part proposes a method for reviewing ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims.
However unfortunate, courts' resistance to claims of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel are not surprising. Because judges are also law-
yers, they empathize with the alleged incompetent attorney for a
number of reasons. First, they are part of the same professional or-
ganization; the client crying "incompetent" is an outsider attacking not
only the individual lawyer, but also the profession. Second, although
judges see their share of very poor lawyering, they also realize that
client's expectations are often unreasonably high and supported by
hyperbolic passion rather than analytical rigor. Because judges prob-
ably still remember the realities of practice, they may also be musing,
"there but for the grace of God go I." Some judges might consider
these clients ungrateful; they received court compensated attorneys and
were lucky they did not have to represent themselves in propria
persona like most other litigants in the civil system. 66 But no matter
what the cause, many judges view claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel with suspicion.
Judges' biases against the concept of incompetence of counsel in
child protection cases need to be mollified because they are based on
faulty analogies to other areas of the legal system. Currently there are
very few attorneys in America truly qualified to represent parents or
children in child protection cases. In fact, many of these attorneys are
appointed "without any prerequisite education in the special knowledge
and skills needed by those who represent children. Most states lack
any statewide effort to support, or upgrade the competency of, court
165. 376 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (I11. App. Ct. 1978). See supra notes 1-8 and
accompanying text.
166. Elrod, supra note 18, at 56.
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appointed attorneys for children."'167 In fact, California, the state with
the most annual child dependency trials, appointed thousands of attor-
neys for decades to represent parents and children without significant
guidelines for defining or training competent dependency counsel.'68
A great deal of marginal lawyering takes place in child protection
court for a variety of reasons. 169 First, the youngest and least ex-
perienced attorneys often begin practice in child abuse cases, 70 where
the newest judges with least experience often shepherd those trials.' 7'
Second, juvenile lawyers and some juvenile court judges are very
poorly paid in relation to their peers. 72 Finally, representing children
adequately in dependency proceedings requires interdisciplinary train-
ing, which is often difficult and expensive to obtain. 1
73
A. Is There a Right to Competent Counsel
in Child Dependency Cases?
The same questions visited in relation to the existence of a right to
counsel in protection cases 74 arise when determining whether there is
the additional right to competent counsel. So much depends upon the
jurisdiction's analysis of the analogy between criminal and dependency
cases. For example, until recently, Wisconsin courts rejected the right
to competent counsel in child protection cases because "[t]he sixth
167. Judge Leonard P. Edwards, The Relationship of Family and Juvenile Courts in
Child Abuse Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 201, 259-60 (1987).
168. Finally in 1994, operative on or before January 1, 1996, the Judicial Counsel
promulgated guidelines for "screening and appointment of competent counsel," and
"establishing minimum standards of experience and education necessary to qualify as
competent counsel." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317.6 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
169. In a survey of dependency counsel in Los Angeles I conducted in 1992,
approximately 50% failed to inform their clients that "data and counts stricken from the
dependency petition as part of the plea agreement could be used against them at the
subsequent disposition hearing or at future dependency review hearings." Patton, Child
Abuse, supra note 99, at 59.
170. Edwards, Comprehensive Approach, supra note 11, at 420.
17 1. Judge Leonard Edwards, Fulfilling the Expectations For the Juvenile Court
Judge, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 33, 34-35 (1992) [hereinafter Edwards, Fulfilling
Expectations].
172. Id. at 33-36. See Hunter Hurst, Judicial Rotation in Juvenile and Family Courts:
A View From the Judiciary, 42 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 13 (1991).
173. ANN M. HARALAMBIE, THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN CUSTODY, ADOPTION. AND PROTECTION CASES (1993); William W. Patton,
Law Schools' Duty to Train Children's Advocates: Blueprint for an Inexpensive
Experientially Based Juvenile Justice Course, 45 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 3 (1994). Robert
Shepherd notes that the quality of representation for children in delinquency cases is
much lower than for adult criminal defendants and that, "even when children are
represented too often their attorneys lack either the commitment or the knowledge to
provide competent, much less zealous, representation." Shepherd, supra note 23, at 35.
174. See supra part Il.
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amendment, by its own terms, is applicable only to criminal cases...
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is not available in a civil
case."' 75 Other courts, such as the California Supreme Court, have
rejected the right to competent counsel in proceedings where perm-
anent termination of parental rights, as opposed to temporary loss of
child custody, is not possible.'76 Still other courts have made a dis-
tinction between a constitutional right and a statutory right to com-
petent counsel. 1'7
Generally, the jurisdictions agree regarding the standard of review
for incompetency of counsel claims where the court found a parent or
child had a constitutional right to appointed counsel either under
Lassiter or pursuant to independent state constitutional grounds.'
78
1 75. In re S.S.K., 422 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Wis. 1988), overruled by In re M.D.S., 485
N.W.2d 52, 55 (Wis. 1992). The strict rule denying competent counsel in dependency
cases slowly gave way to a case by case determination of whether the parent or child was
constitutionally entitled under Lassiter to court appointed counsel. If the answer was
yes, the client also was constitutionally entitled to competent counsel. In re M.D.S.,
472 N.W.2d 819, 823-24 (Wis. 1991), overruled by In re M.D.S., 485 N.W.2d 52, 55
(Wis. 1992). Those two cases were overruled by In re M.D.S., which held "[w]e conclude
that when the legislature provided the right to be 'represented by counsel' or represented
by 'appointed counsel' the legislature intended that right to include the effective
assistance of counsel." Id. The court in In re D.B., 615 N.E.2d 1336 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993), refused to find a right to competent counsel in a termination case because the
counsel was retained, not appointed, and in part because "this is a civil matter." Id. at
1342.
176. In re Malinda S., 795 P.2d 1244, 1252-53 (Cal. 1990) (en banc). However, the
vitality of Malinda S. is subject to considerable doubt because it did not involve the
radically altered California child dependency scheme, which has unified the dependency
and parental termination cases into a single court. See, e.g., In re Arturo A., 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 131, 136 (Ct. App. 1992) (expanding the constitutional right to counsel
beyond the final termination hearing); In re Emilye A., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 301-04
(Ct. App. 1992) (extending a potential due process right to counsel under Lassiter to
non-termination hearings). But see In re Andrew S., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 67475 (Ct.
App. 1994) (limiting the constitutional right to counsel to specific hearings), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct 1408 (1995).
177. See In re Geist, 775 P.2d 843, 847 (Ore. 1989) (stating that Lassiter does not
control the question of whether parents have a right to competent counsel). Although
the court in Geist recognized a constitutional right in a narrow set of circumstances, it
held that the issue could not be raised on direct appeal. Id. But see In re Austin, 810 P.2d
389, 392 (Ore. 1991) (in a dependency case the issue of incompetence of counsel could
be raised on direct appeal). In Grove v. State, 897 P.2d 1252 (Wash. 1995), the court
stated that parents in dependency cases also have a right to effective appellate counsel
even if the original appointment of counsel at the trial was not constitutionally
mandated. Id. at 1259.
178. For instance, in Arturo A., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 131, 135, the court stated:
While some doubt remains, we believe it is reasonably well established that
reversal based on ineffective assistance of counsel is not available when the
right, to counsel was only statutory. Where, however, the right is of
constitutional dimension, the client is entitled not only to counsel but to
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Most jurisdictions have adopted the criminal standard of review for
incompetence of counsel articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington: 179 "First, the defendant [or parent
or child] must show that counsel's performance was deficient ....
Second, the defendant must show the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense."' 80
Considerable differences, however, have arisen among the juris-
dictions regarding the nature of a statutory right to competent counsel
in dependency and termination cases. The richest discussion is con-
tained in In re Adoption of T.M.F.,' 8 ' a Pennsylvania case where
parents alleged that they were denied the effective assistance of counsel
in a parental termination hearing that resulted in the placement of their
child "in foster care with plans for adoption at a later date.' 8s2 The
majority, in an extremely acerbic opinion, debunked the notion that
termination proceedings are similar enough to criminal proceedings as
to require identical or even similar procedures for analyzing allegations
of incompetency of counsel.8 3 The court held that "[t]he procedural
rules, appellate posture and nature of the two classes of cases are so
disparate that to apply the criminal doctrine to these cases would result
in confusion, delays and the necessity for creation of rules of post-trial
procedures, review and rehearings that are inappropriate in such
matters."' 4 The court also rejected the due process analogy between a
criminal defendant's loss of liberty and the loss of a fundamental right
competent assistance of counsel.
Id.
179. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
180. Id. at 687. See Lissa Griffin, The Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate
Counsel, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994). The reasons prejudice must be proven for
incompetency of counsel rather than for denial of counsel are:
(1) the government is not responsible for and hence not able to prevent
attorney errors; (2) attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are just as
likely to be harmless as prejudicial; and (3) representation is an art, and an act
or omission that is considered unprofessional in one setting may be "sound or
even brilliant" in another.
Id. at 12. See also V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1983); In re James S., 278
Cal. Rptr. 295, 300 (Ct. App. 1993); In re Prough, 376 N.E.2d 1078, 1084 (III. App.
Ct. 1978); In re D.T., 547 N.E.2d 278, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); In re Jamie 'IT, 599
N.Y.S.2d 892, 895 (App. Div. 1993); In re Pieper Children, 600 N.E.2d 317, 325 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1991); In re D.D.F., 801 P.2d 703, 707 (Okla. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
922 (1991).
181. 573 A.2d 1035 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
182. Id. at 1037.
183. Id. at 1041.
184. Id.
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of family association. 85 But perhaps the most controversial reason for
rejecting the criminal law analogy is that the court determined that the
role of counsel in termination cases is much less important than in
criminal trials:
[B]ecause of the doctrine of Parens Patriae and the need to
focus on the best interest of the child, the trial judge, who is the
fact finder, is required to be an attentive and involved participant
in the process .... Under the aegis of the court, the role of the
lawyer, while important, does not carry the deleterious impact of
ineffectiveness that may occur in criminal proceedings.'
86
Finally, the court distinguished criminal cases where collateral attack
based on incompetency of counsel will not prejudice the defendant,
with the effect of delay in termination cases which "may do incalcu-
lable damage to the child with only marginal or questionable benefit to
the parent." '87
185. Id. at 1041-42.
186. Id. at 1042. The T.M.F. court's faith in the trial judge is subject to attack for at
least two reasons. Trial judges in the dependency system are overloaded with cases and
cannot physically give cases more than a few moments of their attention. In his
concurring and dissenting opinion in T.M.F., Justice Montemuro gave a vivid
description of juvenile court judges:
Harried judges, case-laden by the demands of populous judicial districts, or in
some instances bearing the entire judicial burden of the areas they serve, may,
despite a full measure of dedication, simply lack the time to perform the role of
parens patriae in any meaningful way .... Under our system of jurisprudence
there is no substitute for competent legal counsel whose primary
responsibility it has always been to ferret out all facts of a case and bring them
to the attention of the trial judge.
Id. at 1047 (Montemuro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The court's
vision of a divine shepherd looking after the flock of cases and having time to minister
to individual children with painstaking care is a false concept.
The T.M.F. court did not acknowledge the institutional and idiosyncratic bias inherent
in the nature of dependency and termination cases. Although judges may be better able
to "avoid intellectual errors or to trace a chain of inferences, the presumption that they
can disregard inappropriate prejudicial data is overbroad." William W. Patton,
Evolution In Child Abuse Litigation: The Theoretical Void Where Evidentiary And
Procedural Worlds Collide, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1992) [hereinafter Patton,
Evolution]. Even psychological professionals have "an almost universal negative
reaction and indeed, revulsion towards the child molester." Arlyne M. Diamond, The
Child Molester and the Legal Process 6 (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pacific
Graduate School of Psychology). Also, the often amorphous legal standards in
dependency cases "promote normative decision-making strongly influenced by
individual judges' attitudes, beliefs and values." Patton, Evolution, supra, at 1013.
Finally, those normative decisions are "exacerbated perhaps to an even greater degree by
the cultural biases of trial judges. Juvenile court judges come from a very narrow
segment of society; over ninety percent are white, married males with an average age of
about fifty-three years." Id. at 1014 (citing 1974 statistics).
187. T.M.F., 573 A.2d at 1043.
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Nonetheless, the T.M.F. majority determined that in certain circum-
stances, allegations of incompetence of counsel would be considered
on direct appeal of a termination order, but not on collateral attack.'88
However, the majority rejected the criminal standard of review set out
by the Supreme Court in Strickland, and instead adopted the following
standard:
[A]n allegation of ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal would
result in a review by this Court of the total record with a
determination to be made whether on the whole, the parties
received a fair hearing, the proof supports the decree by the
standard of clear and convincing evidence, and upon review of
counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, any failure of his stewardship
was the cause of a decree of termination.' 89
Other states have determined that the Strickland standard for judging
effectiveness of counsel in criminal cases should be used in determin-
ing whether statutorily appointed counsel in child dependency cases
was competent: "A right to counsel is of little value unless there is an
expectation that counsel's assistance will be effective. Accordingly,
we conclude that parents [who are appointed counsel pursuant to
Massachusetts statutes] are entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel . .. ."'90
California has witnessed the greatest number of inconsistent ap-
pellate court decisions regarding the issue of effectiveness of counsel
in child dependency trials. In 1981, the court in In re Michael S.' 9'
held that parents with counsel appointed pursuant to statute have no
right to competent court appointed counsel because dependency pro-
ceedings are civil, not criminal. 92 A few years later the court in In re
Christina H.' 93 held that parents entitled to appointment of counsel
under Lassiter are also entitled to effective assistance of counsel if they
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1044. Judge Beck, concurring, suggested that parents should have to meet
a higher burden than criminal defendants in demonstrating that ineffectiveness of
counsel warrants reversal. Id. at 1055 (Beck, J., concurring). Instead of having to prove
a "'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different,"' id. at 1055 n.7 (Beck, J., concurring), he
argues that "[tlhe parent should come forward with evidence that indicates that a high
degree of likelihood exists that but for an unprofessional error on counsel's part,
parental rights would not have been terminated." Id. at 1055 (Beck, J., concurring).
190. In re Stephen, 514 N.E.2d 1087, 1090-91 (Mass. 1987). See also In re D.P..
465 N.W.2d 313, 316 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
191. 179 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Ct. App. 1981).
192. Id. at 554. See Patton, Torn Asunder, supra note 12, at 308-20.
193. 227 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. App. 1986).
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face the likelihood of permanent termination of parental rights. 94 At
about that same time, the court in In re Patricia E. 195 held that "[tihe
minor has a statutory right to appointment of counsel. That right nec-
essarily entails a right to effective assistance of the counsel ap-
pointed."'' 96 This California case law which developed in the 1980s
remained settled until the legislature rewrote the dependency and termi-
nation laws to unify both actions in juvenile court. 197
Since 1992, a series of inconsistent California appellate court
decisions have attempted to articulate the nature of the right to
competent counsel under the new statutory scheme [hereinafter pre-
S.B. 2431.98 In In re Arturo A.,' 99 the court continued the dichotomy
between a constitutional and a statutory right to counsel in holding that:
While some doubt remains, we believe it is reasonably well
established that reversal based on ineffective assistance of
counsel is not available when the right to counsel was only
statutory. Where, however, the right is of constitutional
dimension, the client is entitled not only to counsel but to
competent assistance of counsel.200
The court noted that reliance on pre-S.B. 243 cases may be misguided
because those cases not only distinguished between statutory versus
constitutional rights to counsel, but also between the nature of the
proceeding; in dependency cases there was no right to competent
counsel, while, in termination cases, there was.2 0 ' For the Arturo A.
court, the dispositive variable was not the label of the hearing, but
rather whether the hearings have the "potential of termination of paren-
tal rights. 2 2 If the potential for termination of parental rights exists,
then there is a constitutional right to competent counsel; however,
"[p]resumably those hearings which do not directly threaten permanent
separation of child from parent do not implicate due process rights and
hence cannot be productive of error by reason of ineffective assistance
of counsel. 20 3 Arturo A. extended the right to competent counsel to
194. Id. at 43. See also In re Christina P., 220 Cal. Rptr. 525, 532 (Ct. App. 1985).
But see In re Ammanda G., 231 Cal. Rptr. 372, 373 (Ct. App. 1986).
195. 219 Cal. Rptr. 783 (Ct. App. 1985).
196. Id. at 787-88.
197. For a description of the changes in the dependency and termination laws in
California, see supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
198. For a discussion of some of the different appellate arguments regarding
ineffectiveness of counsel, see Seiser; supra note 163.
199. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
200. Id. at 135.
201. Id. at 136.
202. Id.
203. Id. The court noted that this was consistent with pre-S.B. 243 law as stated in In
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hearings which involve a referral to the termination hearing since they
have the "potential of terminating reunification services and setting a
[termination] hearing. ' 2°
The next California court to address the scope of the right to com-
petent counsel, In re Emilye A.,205 used a Lassiter/Matthews test2° in
determining whether a parent has a constitutional right to counsel as
well. 20 7 The Emilye A. court stated that "[like termination proceed-
ings, dependency proceedings may work a unique kind of deprivation.
Indeed, they are frequently the first step on the road to permanent sev-
erance of parental ties. 20  The court therefore held that "where a pa-
rent has established a constitutional right to counsel, whether ap-
pointed or retained, in a dependency proceeding, she or he is entitled
to effective assistance of counsel., 2 9 The court in In re Emilye A.
thus approved a test much broader than used in In re Arturo A., be-
cause the nature of the hearing in Emilye A. is not dispositive, but
rather just one variable to consider in the Lassiter/Matthews balancing
test.2"° Although the California courts appear to have determined that
there is no right to effective assistance of counsel for statutorily ap-
pointed attorneys, the legislature has recently provided that right: "All
parties who are represented by counsel at dependency proceedings
shall be entitled to competent counsel."'2 '
B. Proposed Standards of Appellate Review for Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
Whether California will establish different standards of review for
statutory as opposed to constitutional rights to competent counsel re-
mains uncertain. Emilye A. adopted the Strickland standard for inef-
re Malinda S., 795 P.2d 1244, 1262-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). Id.
204. Id.
205. 12 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Ct. App. 1992).
206. See supra part 11 for a discussion of these tests.
207. Etilye A., 12 Cal Rptr. at 300-03.
208. Id. at 301.
209. Id. The court relied, in part, on the Lassiter concern about possible criminal
charges in determining that the father had a constitutional right to appointed counsel.
Id.
210. Seiser, supra note 163, at 19: "Thus under the Enilye A. decision the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel can arguably be raised at any dependency hearing." But
see In re Andrew S., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 674-75 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1408
(1995) (finding no constitutional right to counsel at a CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
366.26 hearing).
211. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317.5 (a) (West 1996). Section 317.5 (b) also
provides that "[e]ach minor who is the subject of a dependency proceeding is a party to
that proceeding." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317.5 (b) (West 1996).
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fective assistance of counsel in dependency proceedings."' However,
Arturo A. added a decisive layer to the Strickland test. Not only must
the parent "show negligence on the part of her attorney but also that the
negligence resulted in prejudice. In order to show prejudice it would
be necessary to show that a different result would be obtained were the
[finding of termination] reversed and a new hearing ordered. '1 3
Arturo A. thus requires the parent to demonstrate that now rather than
at the time of the alleged incompetence, the parents would be able to
retain or regain custody of their child. As the Arturo A. court stated,
"[t]he new hearing would entail not only the facts and evidence
brought forth at the original hearing, but of necessity would require
evidence as to the current status of the child."2 4 The court will require
evidence on "what has happened to the child since the hearing that is
being reversed. Has the child been placed with its adopting parents?
Is the child doing well? Has the child bonded to new foster-adoptive
parents? If the child two years ago knew his parent, does he still
remember her? '2 5 The Arturo A. standard of prejudice is so bizarre
that not even the court itself could posit it with a straight face: "What
we are discussing is, in reality, the appellate court's holding an
updated review hearing in the guise of determination of prejudice.
Should appellate courts do this? Probably not."216
Although I laud the Arturo A. court's attempt to consider the best
interests of the child in assuring a stable placement, the proposed
appellate remedy is problematic for several reasons. First, placing the
burden on the non-custodial parent to present the appellate court with
sufficient evidence of the child's current status is unfair because the
parent will not have access to much of the custody and maturation data;
the county and the foster/prospective adoptive parents are holders of
most of that data.217 Second, the parent or the parent's counsel will be
required to investigate and interview dozens of witnesses such as care
givers, teachers, religious leaders, relatives, and social workers in
order to gather sufficient data to present to the court in a writ regarding
the likelihood of regaining custody at a termination hearing based upon
the "now existing" status of the child. Such fact investigation will not
212. Emilye A., 12 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
213. Arturo A., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139.
214. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 140-41.
216. Id. at 141.
217. Id. The court refused to remand the case because it had been presented with
insufficient evidence regarding the present status of the child. Id. Therefore, this
evidentiary burden may very well be dispositive on the issue of prejudice caused by
incompetence of counsel. Id.
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only cost a great deal of money, but it will also take considerable time.
Finally, the parent will be prejudiced by this allocation of burden be-
cause, as the Arturo A. court noted, the longer the review takes, the
less likely the return of the child would be at a new section 366.26
hearing because the child may have bonded with alternative care
takers.
A fairer and more cost efficient procedure would be to require the
parent to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland regarding the hearing
in which counsel was alleged to have been incompetent. The state
would then assume the burden to demonstrate that, under current facts,
the earlier incompetence of counsel is harmless because of the current
status of the child. Shifting to the state the burden of showing the
harmlessness of counsel's incompetence would decrease the specu-
lative fact investigation that parents would need to use because parents
would then merely have to rebut the state's arguments regarding the
harmlessness of the error rather than fashion their own.
Arturo A. indicated that "[i]f and when a proper case arises, and a
prima facie showing of probable prejudice is made before the appellate
court, we will probably remand the case to the trial court for the evi-
dentiary hearing as to prejudice. ' ' 218 This will again extend uncer-
tainty, frustrate finality, and substantially increase the parent's burden,
because the longer the child is separated, the more difficult it will be to
demonstrate the child should be returned. But what alternatives exist?
There are at least two. First, as courts have often noted, cases
concerning termination of parental rights are very different than most
cases; for the past two decades courts and legislatures have crafted
novel and prophylactic rules in these delicate cases.21 9 One approach
is to have the appellate court sit as the finder of fact and decide whether
the denial of competent counsel warrants a new protection or termi-
nation hearing in the trial court based upon a finding that denial of
competent appointed counsel was sufficiently prejudicial. Those argu-
ments against courts acting as fact finders in criminal cases do not
apply in termination cases because there is no jury and the trial court
already makes all determinations of fact.22' Having the appellate court
decide the incompetence issue will obviate two extra procedural hear-
ings required by the Arturo A. approach: there will be no remand on
218. Id.
219. For discussions of the many specialized rules of court and evidence code
modifications regarding dependency and termination cases, see Patton, Evolution, supra
note 186, at 1016-23; Patton, Appellate Review, supra note 116, at 542.
220. See George C. Christie, Judicial Review Of Findings Of Fact, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
14, 52-56 (1992).
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the question of prejudice and only a writ or review to the Supreme
Court will remain, thus shortening the appellate process.22'
A second, yet less attractive approach, is to require the parent to
prove Strickland prejudice in the appellate court regarding the effect of
alleged denial of counsel in the hearing in which it occurred. If the pa-
rent demonstrates such prejudice, the appellate court would remand to
the trial court to determine whether under the child's current status the
denial of competent counsel in the earlier hearing still requires a new
child protection or termination hearing. If the answer is "no," then the
parents can appeal that order. If the answer is "yes," then a new hear-
ing in the trial court should be held immediately to determine the prop-
er disposition of the case pursuant to the laws governing the adjudi-
catory or termination hearings. Both of these approaches provide a
much speedier procedure for determining finality than the Arturo A.
approach and place the burden of demonstrating prejudice more fairly
on the parties best able to prove the effect of the incompetence of
counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION
States have tremendous power to determine the continuing existence
of family units. The procedures employed to decide whether the gov-
ernment will subject mothers, fathers, and children to involuntary state
intervention into their family affairs will often be dispositive and out-
come determinative. All empirical evidence suggests that parents and
children without attorneys fair much poorer in protection and termi-
nation cases than those who are represented. This Article has sug-
gested that not applying the Fulminante reversal per se standard to
cases of denial of counsel in these fundamental rights hearings will
lead to results which are not in the best interests of families or states.
However, if a jurisdiction rejects Fulminante, the best alternative is the
Chapman standard of review, which properly places the burden on the
state to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the denial of
counsel was harmless. Although states are beginning to experiment
with standards lesser than those required under Strickland when de-
termining the prejudice from appointment of incompetent counsel,
22 1. Of course, the parents can still file a writ or review in the California Supreme
Court, but it does at least accelerate finality of appellate review. Some may believe that
parents' appellate rights will be eviscerated by losing a review by the intermediate court
of appeal. But the judgment on the issue of prejudice in the court of appeal is less likely
to be subject to the predilections and normative biases of a ruling by a single superior
court judge; the parents therefore gain more in fairness and accuracy of decision and in an
expedited review than they lose in forfeiting an automatic review in the court of appeal.
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those experiments are not in the state's or family's best interests.
There is no evidence that changing the standard will reduce the cost of
the appellate process or delimit the extensive duration from initial juve-
nile court jurisdiction to parental termination or eventual family reunifi-
cation and dismissal of the wardship. Since the state, as much as the
family, has a compelling state interest in the accuracy and complete-
ness of the hearings, states should not pose unreasonable and often
impossible burdens on parents or children who allege that they were
denied effective counsel. By shifting the burden to parents to demon-
strate prejudice not only from the denial of competence of counsel but
also to demonstrate that under current facts they would likely regain
custody of their child will delay certainty, reduce accuracy, and delay
finality. The very least a state can do is assure that parents will not
permanently lose their children based upon the incompetent repre-
sentation of court appointed counsel.
